ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Traditional solutions to the problem of privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP), such as kanonymity [1] , l-diversity [2] , and t-closeness [3] , only guarantee that privacy is preserved if a published table is created from a centralized dataset. Recently, many researchers have shown that if there are multiple published tables created from a centralized dataset (which can be either dynamic or static), privacy may not be preserved even if every published table satisfies a certain privacy preserving requirement individually [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . This problem is called serial data publishing (on a centralized dataset). In this paper, we consider a similar but different problem: data publishing on non-centralized datasets. The non-centralized datasets that we refer to are multiple datasets that have a common sensitive attribute with the same domain and store information about the same group of individuals, but they are owned by different data holders that cannot share information with each other due to privacy reasons. We are going to show that privacy may not be preserved even if all published tables generated from such multiple noncentralized datasets satisfy certain privacy preserving requirements for data publishing individually. It is illustrated in the following example. Table 1 shows two private tables, namely PriT R and PriT C , which are solely owned by the Revenue Department and the Censor Department respectively. Both PriT R and PriT C store income information of the same group of individuals. Some data miners may find such information useful for their manpower researches. However, due to privacy reasons or even enforced by law, private tables PriT R and PriT C cannot be released directly to any other parties.
Instead, the Revenue Department and the Censor Department release two published tables, denoted as T age and T ZIP code , which are created by generalizing or suppressing the attributes of Table 1 . Two private tables PriT R and PriT C .
Name
Age Gender Salary Class Table T ZIP code PriT R and PriT C respectively. An example is shown in Table 2 , where T age and T ZIP code individually satisfy distinct 2-diversity [2] , which is a traditional privacy preserving requirement for data publishing. Even if an adversary can obtain access to either T age or T ZIP code and possess the identification information (the age and the ZIP code) of an individual (the victim), the adversary cannot deduce the exact sensitive attribute value of the victim. At best, the adversary can only narrow down the number of possible sensitive attribute values to two. However, ensuring that T age and T ZIP code satisfy distinct 2-diversity individually is not enough to preserve privacy. We will show that if an adversary can obtain access to both T age and T ZIP code , the adversary may be able to deduce some information that cannot be deduced from either T age or T ZIP code individually, and such information may cause privacy breaches. Suppose an adversary knows the following identification information of the victim.
From T age (Table 2 (a)) and the fact that the victim's age < 40, the adversary deduces that the salary class of the victim is either "Low" or "Middle". From T ZIP code (Table 2 (b)) and the fact that the victim's ZIP code < 20k, the adversary deduces that the salary class of the victim is either "Low" or "High". Since both T age and T ZIP code have a tuple that corresponds to the victim, the adversary can combine the above results and deduce that the salary class of the victim must be "Low". In other words, the adversary can deduce the exact sensitive value of the victim. Hence, 2-diversity is violated even if both T age and T ZIP code are 2-diverse tables individually. The objective of this paper is to present a way to release published tables that will not cause privacy breaches in non-centralized environment. Firstly, we propose two approaches for a data holder to determine the private information that will be deduced by an adversary who can get access to all non-centralized published tables if the data holder releases a published table. Since there may be correlations among the attributes in different published tables, two approaches are needed. The first approach is for the scenario that the adversary knows such correlations. This approach determines the private information deduced by such an adversary by considering how the adversary utilizes the correlations to deduce the private information. The second approach is for the scenario that the adversary does not know such correlations. This approach determines the private information deduced by such an adversary by considering how the adversary makes a conditional independent assumption to deduce private information. For both approaches, the data holder does not need to communicate with other data holders. Instead, the data holder only needs to collect published tables generated by other data holders. Secondly, we propose how to adopt distinct l-diversity [2] , which is a privacy preserving requirement for centralized data publishing, to non-centralized data publishing. It is so called non-centralized distinct l-diversity. Thirdly, we propose an algorithm for a data holder to generate published tables that satisfy non-centralized distinct l-diversity. Our algorithm is modified from Incognito [13] , which is an efficient and widely-used algorithm for (centralized) data publishing. Theorems are presented to show the correctness of the proposed algorithm. Experiments on real datasets are conducted to show that the proposed algorithm is feasible to real applications. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 presents the table models used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the private information deduced from multiple published tables in a non-centralized environment. Section 5 presents the noncentralized version of distinct l-diversity and an algorithm for non-centralized PPDP. Section 6 presents the experiment results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
This paper focuses on data publishing on non-centralized datasets. There has been extensive research in PPDP, such as k-anonymity [1] , l-diversity [2] , and t-closeness [3] . However, they focus on the cases for a single centralized dataset and a single published table. In the previous section, we have shown that these solutions cannot be directly applied to the cases for multiple published tables.
Recently, the problem of serial data publishing has attracted a lot of attentions. These research works can be classified into serial data publishing on a dynamic dataset and serial data publishing on a static dataset. Most of the works focus on the cases for a dynamic dataset (or multiple instances of data), which includes an incremental dataset [4] [5] (i.e. allowing insertions of new tuples), a dataset with insertions and deletions [6] , a dataset with insertions, deletions, and updates [7] , a dataset with sensitive values that change over time [8] . Some other works focus on the cases for a static dataset, such as [9] . Nevertheless, all such works cannot be applied to our problem. It is because they require the data holder to possess a dataset or a series of dataset instances that contains all information. However, in the non-centralized datasets problem, no one possesses all information.
We propose a statistical approach to determine the private information deduced by an adversary and the results are stored in a probabilistic table. Many previous works also use probabilistic approach [10] or deal with probabilistic databases [11] [12].
Our proposed algorithm that generates published tables is modified from Incognito [13] . 
TABLE MODELS
In this section, we present the private • Explicit-identifier attributes. Each of them can uniquely identify an individual in the private table, such as the name.
• Quasi-identifier attributes [1] . It is a set of attributes that may uniquely identify an individual in the private table when some of such attributes are considered together and linked to an external dataset, such as the age and the gender.
• A sensitive attribute. It stores sensitive information about an individual, such as the salary class. In this paper, we consider the private tables that share a common sensitive attribute and store information about the same group of individuals. Table 2 (a) has one quasi-identifier attribute age and two ECs, namely EC age ≥ 40 and EC age < 40 .
Published Table
• A sensitive attribute. All published tables share a common sensitive attribute S, which is the same as the sensitive attribute shared by all private tables.
PRIVATE INFORMATION DEDUCED FROM MULTIPLE PUBLISHED TABLES
In this section, we discuss the private information deduced by an adversary who can obtain access to multiple published tables for non-centralized data publishing. 
Private Information Deduced by Simple Counting on Each Published Tables
Consider a victim who has a tuple in both published tables T age and T ZIP code depicted in Table 2 . Let h, m, and l be the events that the salary classes of the victim are "High", "Middle", and "Low" respectively. Let P(H), P(M), and P(L) be the probabilities that the salary classes of the victim are "High", "Middle", and "Low" respectively. We assume that the private tables are consistent and hence P(H) can be computed by counting the number of tuples with sensitive attribute values = "High" in either T age or T ZIP code . In our example, there are four out of 12 tuples with values equal to "High" in each of T age and T ZIP code , which store information about the same group of individuals and the sensitive attribute values are the same. Hence, we have P(H) = 4/12 = 0.333. Similarly, we have P(M) = P(L) = 0.333.
Consider an adversary who (1) can obtain access to both T age and T ZIP code , (2) knows that there is a tuple in both T age and T ZIP code that corresponds to the victim, and (3) knows that the victim's age ≥ 40 and the victim's ZIP code ≥ 20k. The adversary can deduce some private information, in terms of conditional probabilities, about the victim from each of T age and T ZIP code individually. First we consider T age . Since the victim's age ≥ 40, the tuple that corresponds to the victim must be one of the first eight tuples. Among these eight tuples, four of them have the sensitive attribute value = "High". Hence, the conditional probability that the salary class of the victim is "High" given that the victim's age ≥ 40 is 4/8 = 0.5. Such a conditional probability is denoted as P(H|A ≥ 40), where A be the age of the victim. Similarly, the adversary can deduce conditional probabilities P(M|A ≥ 40) = 0.25 and P(L|A ≥ 40) = 0.25 from T age . Next we consider T ZIP code . Let Z be the ZIP code of the victim. Similarly, the adversary can deduce P(H|Z ≥ 20k) = 0.25, P(M|Z ≥ 20k) = 0.5, and P(L|Z ≥ 20k) = 0.25 from T ZIP code .
Private Information Deduced from Multiple Published Tables
As mentioned in Section 1, although published tables T age and T ZIP code (Table 2 ) satisfy the 2-diversity requirement individually, an adversary who can obtain access to both T age and T ZIP code may be able to deduce further private information that violates such a requirement. We propose some approaches to determine such further private information deduced by the adversary. The proposed approach can be used to verify whether releasing a non-centralized published table cause privacy breaches, which is an important step for our proposed algorithm to generate noncentralized published tables.
In Section 4.1, we presented the conditional probabilities deduced from each of T age and T ZIP code by the simple counting approach. The conditions of such conditional probabilities involve either A or Z, but not both. As an example, the conditional probabilities deduced in the previous subsection are P(H|A ≥ 40) and P(H|Z ≥ 20k). However, the adversary actually wants to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k), which is the conditional probability that the sensitive attribute value of the victim is high given that A ≥ 40 and Z ≥ 20k. It is because the adversary knows the age and the ZIP code of the victim and is able to obtain access to both T age and T ZIP code .
Although the age and the ZIP code attributes are in different private tables hold by different data holders, it is not surprising that there is a correlation between the two attributes. For example, a city may have more elder people than younger people. Hence, the probability that an individual who lives in such a city is an elderly is higher. There are two ways to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k). The first way is for the adversary who does not know the QI attribute correlation. Such an adversary can make the conditional independent assumption to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k). The second way is for the adversary who does not know the QI attribute correlation. Such an adversary can use a statistical approach to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k). In the rest of this subsection, we will discuss these two ways to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k).
Without Knowing the Quasi-Identifier Attribute Correlation
Consider an adversary who does not know the correlation between the age and the ZIP code attributes. It seems that the adversary can compute the P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k) value by assuming that the age and the ZIP code attributes are independent, and then use the independence property P(A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k) = P(H|A ≥ 40) · P(Z ≥ 20k). Unfortunately, such an assumption cannot be made. It is because the knowledge about the ZIP code of an individual may be updated by knowing the age of the individual. It is illustrated in the following example. Suppose the adversary does not know the age of the individual. In T ZIP code , there are 12 tuples and eight of them have ZIP code ≥ 20k.
Hence, the probability that the individual's ZIP code ≥ 20k is 2/3. Such a probability is denoted as p. On the other hand, suppose the adversary knows that the individual's age < 40. From T age , the adversary knows the individual's tuple must be one of the last four tuples. Hence, the salary class of the individual is either "Low" or "Middle" with equal chance. With such information, the adversary can eliminate the tuples with sensitive attribute value = "High" in T ZIP code . Among the remaining eight tuples, six of them have ZIP code ≥ 20k. Hence, the adversary now has p = 3/4. In other words, by knowing the victim's age < 40, the value of p is updated from 2/3 to 3/4. This counter example explains why the adversary cannot assume that the age and the ZIP code attributes are independent.
In fact, to compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k), the adversary who does not know the QI attribute correlation can make the following assumption: the age and ZIP code attributes are conditionally independent given the value of the salary class attribute. In probability theory, conditional independence for events E 1 and E 2 is defined as follows: E 1 and E 2 are two conditionally independent events given event G if and only if P(E 1 ,E 2 |G) = P(E 1 |G) · P(E 2 |G).
Here we use an example to illustrate how to make the conditional independence assumption in our problem. If the salary class of the individual is given in the first place, the knowledge about the ZIP code of an individual is independent of the knowledge of the age of the individual. In other words, knowing the ZIP code (or the age) of the individual will not update the knowledge about the age (or the ZIP code) of the individual. It is illustrated in the following example. Suppose the information that the salary class of the victim is either "Low" or "Middle" with equal chance is given in the first place. With such information, the adversary has p = 3/4 already even if we do not know the individual's age and only consider T ZIP code . Hence, even if the adversary now knows that the individual's age < 40, the value of p will not be updated. This is also true if the salary class of the victim equals to other value(s). It is because the salary class attribute is the only connection between the age and the ZIP code attributes if the adversary does not know the QI attribute correlation. By knowing the age attribute, one can update the knowledge about the salary class attribute, which can be used to update the knowledge about the ZIP code attribute. If such an updated knowledge about the salary class attribute is given in the first place, it will update the knowledge about the ZIP code of the individual regardless of the knowledge about the age of the individual.
With such an assumption, the adversary can compute P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k) as follows.
• By the definition of conditional probability, P(H|A ≥ 40 , Z ≥ 20k) can be expressed as Equation (1) .
• The salary class has only three possible values, by the law of alternatives, Equation (1) can be expressed as Equation (2).
• By the product rule of conditional probabilities, Equation (2) can be expressed as (3) .
• By the definition of conditional independence, Equation (3) can be expressed as Equation (4).
• By simple counting on T age and T ZIP code individually, the adversary can deduce P(A ≥ 40|H) = 0. The conditional independence assumption for such a general case is stated as follows. Assumption 1 is needed by the adversary who does not know the QI attribute correlation to deduce private information from multiple published tables by considered them together. Note that if the adversary knows the QI attribute correlation, the adversary does not need this assumption to deduce the required private information (see the next part of this subsection).
The idea of Assumption 1 is that if the value of S is given in the first place, the knowledge about the A 1 , ..., A m values of an individual are independent to each other. In other words, knowing the A i value of the individual will not update the knowledge about the A j value of the individual for 1 ≤ i ≠ j ≤ m. In probability theory, conditional independence for events E 1 , ..., E m is defined as follows. Consider the worst case that the adversary can obtain access to all n published tables and know the values of all m quasi-identifier attributes for the victim. Let S k be a possible value of S for 1 ≤ k ≤ s.
Here shows that the adversary is able to compute P(
, which is conditional probability that the sensitive attribute value of the victim is S k given that
can be expressed as an expression containing terms that can be calculated by simple counting on the published tables (such an expression is the general case for Equation (4) . By the definition of conditional probability, it can be expressed as
By the law of alternatives, the above can be expressed as
By the product rule of conditional probabilities, the above can be expressed as
By Assumption 1 and Definition 1, the above can be expressed as
where All the terms in Equation (5) can be deduced easily. As described earlier, the probabilities P(S 1 ), ..., P(S s ) can be calculated by simple counting on any one of T 1 , ..., T n ; the conditional probabilities p 1,k , ... p n,k can be calculated by simple counting on each of T 1 , ..., T n respectively. Therefore, the adversary is able to compute P(
Similarly, the adversary can also calculate conditional probabilities from Table 5 shows two published tables T' age and T' ZIP code with different presentations such that they store the number of tuples having each sensitive value for each EC. Such a presentation is more convenient to illustrate our idea presented in this subsection.
Consider an adversary who can get access to T' age and T' ZIP code and knows the correlation between the age and the ZIP code attributes. Such a correlation can be expressed in a probability equation, e.g. P(A ≥ 40|Z ≥ 20k) = 4/9. We assume that such a correlation is consistent with the private tables and the published tables. • table having sensitive value "Middle" and "Low" are three and two respectively.
From the above information, although the adversary cannot construct the imaginary table precisely, the adversary can compute conditional probabilities P(H|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k), P(M|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k), and P(L|A ≥ 40, Z ≥ 20k) as follows.
The adversary first constructs all possible instances of the imaginary table. Let h, m, and l be the number of tuples in an imaginary table instance having sensitive value of "High", "Middle", and "Low"' respectively.
The adversary can write a simple program to find out all possible values of h, m, and l. Table 6 shows such possible values for our example. We observe that there are 10 possible imaginary  table instances It may not be possible for a data holder to know what the QI attribute correlation will be obtained by an adversary. Nevertheless, the data holder can still use the above equation to make the published table satisfy non-centralized l-diversity regardless of the QI attribute correlation possessed by the adversary. More details will be explained in the next subsection.
Probabilistic Table
The conditional probabilities computed in the previous subsections can be stored systematically in a table called a probabilistic table, which allows data holders to estimate the information deduced by an adversary in order to verify whether releasing a published table will cause privacy breaches. A probabilistic table for n published tables is denoted as PT 1~n . It consists of three sets of attributes:
• Quasi-identifier attributes. The quasi-identifier attributes of all previous published tables, i.e., A 1 , ..., A m . Same as an equivalence class of a published table, an equivalence class of a probabilistic table is defined as a collection of tuples with the same quasi-identifier attribute values.
• A sensitive attribute. It is the common sensitive attribute of all previous published tables. Let 
., s are also stored in this attribute.
As an example, Table 7 shows PT age, ZIP code , which is a probabilistic table for published tables T age and T ZIP code in Table 2 . The probabilistic table PT age, ZIP code contains quasi-identifier attributes "Age" and "ZIP Code", a sensitive attribute "Salary Class", and an attribute storing probability values. The first row of PT age, ZIP code indicates that given the victim's age ≥ 40 and the victim's ZIP code ≥ 20k, the conditional probability that the salary class of the victim is "High" is 0.4.
In practice, an adversary may only be able to obtain access to some of the n published tables and/or may only know that some of the m quasi-identifier attribute values that correspond to the victim. 
PRIVACY PRESERVING REQUIREMENT AND ALGORITHM FOR NON-CENTRALIZED DATA PUBLISHING
In this section, we present the non-centralized version of distinct l-diversity and an algorithm for non-centralized PPDP. Section 5.1 proposes how to adopt distinct l-diversity as a privacy preserving requirement for non-centralized data publishing. Section 5.2 proposes an algorithm, which is modified from Incognito [13] , to generate a published table that satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity. Section 5.3 proves the correctness of applying the modified version of Incognito to the non-centralized data publishing problem. We propose that distinct l-diversity [2] , which is a privacy preserving requirement for centralized data publishing, can also be used for non-centralized data publishing. In other words, it can be used by DH n to ensure that releasing T n does not cause privacy breaches. It is explained as follows. Consider an equivalence class in probabilistic table PT 1~n . The number of tuples having non-zero probability attribute values can be regarded as the number of possible sensitive attribute values of the victim deduced by an adversary who possesses the identification information of the victim. It shares the same semantic of the l value in distinct l-diversity. Hence, we can define distinct l-diversity for non-centralized data publishing under our proposed framework as follows.
Non-centralized Distinct l-diversity

Defintion 2.
(Distinct l-diversity for an equivalence class) An equivalence class in probabilistic table PT 1~n satisfies distinct l-diversity if and only if it has at least l tuples having non-zero probability attribute values.
For example, the four equivalence classes in PT age, ZIP code (Table 7 ) satisfy distinct l-diversity for l = 3, 2, 2, 1 (from the top to the bottom).
According to distinct l-diversity for centralized data publishing, a published (Table 7) only satisfies distinct l-diversity for l = 1.
PT 1~n represents the worst case that an adversary can obtain access to all n published tables and knows the values of all m quasi-identifier attributes of all individuals. According to the definition of distinct l-diversity [2] , if PT 1~n satisfies distinct l-diversity, we can say that no privacy breaches will occur for such a worst case. However, in practice, other possible cases may happen such that the adversary may only be able to obtain access to n' published tables and/or may only know m' quasi-identifier values about the victim, where n' < n and m' < m. Theorems 1 and 2 show that if PT 1~n (the worst case) satisfies distinct l-diversity, probabilistic tables for all other possible cases will also satisfy distinct l-diversity.
Theorem 1.
If the probabilistic table PT 1~n that is constructed by the adversary who can obtain access to all n published tables satisfies distinct l-diversity, the probabilistic table PT 1~n' that is constructed by the adversary who can only obtain access to n' published tables also satisfies distinct l-diversity, where n' < n. (Proof skipped due to page limit) Theorem 2. If the probabilistic table PT 1~n that is constructed by the adversary who possesses the values of all m quasi-identifier attributes of the victim satisfies distinct l-diversity, the probabilistic table PT' 1~n that is constructed by the adversary who only possesses the values of m' < m quasi-identifier attributes of the victim also satisfies distinct l-diversity. (Proof skipped due to page limit) Theorems 1 and 2 imply that no privacy breach will occur for all other possible cases if the worst case does not cause privacy breach.
Next, we consider published table T n . The reason for data holder DH n to construct PT 1~n is to check whether privacy breaches will occur for releasing published table T n . We say that no privacy breaches will occur for releasing published table T n if probabilistic table PT 1~n satisfy distinct l-diversity. It is because according to Definition 3 and Theorems 1 and 2, if PT 1~n satisfies distinct l-diversity, no privacy breaches will occur for the case that an adversary can obtain access to all/some published tables, which may include T n . Hence, no privacy breaches will occur for releasing published table T n .
The relationship among T n , PT 1~n , and (non-centralized) distinct l-diversity is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.
(Non-centralized distinct l-diversity for T n ) If probabilistic table PT 1~n satisfies distinct l-diversity, we say that T n satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity.
Note that in order for T n to satisfy non-centralized distinct l-diversity with l = l', previous published tables T 1 , ..., T n-1 have to also satisfy non-centralized distinct l-diversity with l ≥ l'. Otherwise, it is possible that T n cannot satisfy non-centralized distinct l-diversity with l = l' no matter how T n is generalized.
Adopting distinct l-diversity [2] to the problem of non-centralized data publishing allow us to propose an efficient algorithm to generate a published table that satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity. It is explained as follows. Firstly, as proved in Theorems 1 and 2, we only need to ensure that the worst case will not cause privacy breaches instead of checking all possible cases. Secondly, non-centralized distinct l-diversity satisfies the generalization property and the subset property, which are necessary to apply Incognito [13] to generate published tables correctly and efficiently (see Theorems 3 and 4).
Algorithm
Intuitively, a data holder, say DH n , can use the following steps (Steps 1 to 3) to generate a published table T n that satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity (later we will show that Step 2 can be skipped).
•
Step 1: Collect T 1 , ..., and T n-1 .
• Step 2: Construct a probabilistic table PT 1~(n-1) from T 1 , ..., and T n-1 .
• Step 3: Generate T n from Pri n such that PT 1~n satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity.
Step 1 is to collect the related published tables that have been already released by other data holders.
Step 2 is to construct a probabilistic table PT 1~(n-1) from the collected published tables.
Step 3 is to generate T n by the modified version of Incognito [13] , so that PT 1~n , which is constructed by combining T n and PT 1~(n-1) , satisfies non-centralized distinct l-diversity.
Nevertheless, we figure out how to verify whether PT 1~n satisfies non-centralized distinct ldiversity without actually constructing PT 1~n . Hence, we do not need Step 2 to construct PT 1~(n-1) neither. To explain how to do so, we first describe the steps (Steps A to C) to construct PT 1~n from PT 1~(n-1) and T n .
Step A: The first step is to generate all equivalence classes of PT 1~n . Recall that an equivalence class is a collection of tuples with the same quasi-identifier attribute values. Hence, we can use a set of quasi-identifier attribute values to be the name of an equivalence class. The name of an equivalence class in PT 1~n can be obtained by taking the union of the name of an equivalence class in PT 1~(n-1) and that in T n . For example, let X, Y, and
respectively. Z is obtained by taking the union of X and Y. The names of all equivalence classes in PT 1~n are all possible combinations of the equivalence class names in PT 1~(n-1) and those in T n . In other words, the number of equivalence classes in PT 1~n equals to the number of equivalence classes in PT 1~(n-1) multiplies the number of equivalence classes in T n .
• Step B: The second step is to generate sensitive attribute values with non-zero conditional probabilities for all equivalence classes in PT 1~n . Let S X , S Y , and S Z be the set of S values with non-zero conditional probabilities in X, Y, and Z respectively. In Equation (5), if all the terms on the right hand side are non-zero, the resulting conditional probability on the left hand side is non-zero. If any term on the right hand side is zero, the resulting conditional probability on the left hand side is zero. Hence, if Z is obtained by taking the union of X and Y, we have S Z = S X ∩ S Y . For example, if S X = {"High", "Middle"} and S Y = {"Middle", "Low"}, we have S Z = {"Middle"}.
•
Step C: The third step is to apply Equation (5) Incognito is still efficient with the aforesaid modification. It is because the modified requirement checking step, which is the only step that we modify on Incognito, is still working on equivalence classes and is not computationally intensive.
Theorems
In this subsection, we prove the correctness of applying the modified version of Incognito to the non-centralized data publishing problem.
To apply Incognito, the privacy preserving requirement has to satisfy the generalization property and the subset property [13] . Generalization property means that suppose T A and T B are generalized from a private 
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experiment results. The objective of our experiment is to evaluate whether our non-centralized algorithm is feasible to real applications. The algorithm is feasible if it can generate a published table in a reasonable time from real databases, where each of them contains more quasi-identifier (QI) attributes and a large number of tuples. Section 6.1 presents the settings of the experiment. Section 6.2 presents the metrics measured in the experiment. Section 6.3 presents and discusses the experiment results. 
Settings
All experiments were performed on a computer with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.80GHz CPU and 3.2GB RAM running Windows XP and IBM DB2 Express-C. We modify Incognito [13] to become our non-centralized algorithm. To simulate a non-centralized data publishing environment, we divide a real (centralized) database SAL (from http://ipums.org) into a number of (non-centralized) private tables. SAL contains 700k tuples, each of which stores information about an American adult. Table 9 shows the schema of SAL that we use, which has seven QI attributes: age, education, birthplace, occupation, race, work class, and marital status; and a sensitive attribute: income. Each possible value of an attribute is represented by an integer. Table 9 shows the range and the number of possible values for each attribute.
Similar to Incognito, our non-centralized algorithm requires users to define generalization levels for each QI attribute to indicate how to generalize the QI attribute in a published table. In our experiments, we define four generalization levels for each QI attribute: level-0 represents no generalization, while level-1, level-2, and level-3 represent the generalization that results in four, two, and one equivalence classes respectively.
The four parameters for our experiments are l, |QI|, l pre , and |QI pre |. They are explained as follows.
• l is the l value for the distinct l-diversity requirement, i.e. the number of distinct sensitive values for each equivalence class has to be larger than or equal to l.
• |QI| is the number of QI attributes for the current published table.
• l pre is the distinct l-diversity requirement for the previous published 
Metrics
We measure the following three metrics in our experiment. the published table given a probabilistic table and a private  table. 2. The number of published tables that satisfy the requirement. We call these published tables published 
Elapsed time for generating
Results and Discussions
We performed four sets of experiment. Their parameters are shown in Table 10 . Figure 1 shows the experimental results. There are three observations about elapsed time based on the experimental results.
1. The first observation is that our non-centralized algorithm takes less than 180s to generate a published There are two observations about the minimum average generalization level based on the experimental results.
1. The first observation is that if the l value increases, then the minimum average generalization level increases. It is because a more generalized published table is needed for a more restrictive requirement. 2. The second observation is that if the |QI| value increases, then the minimum average generalization level increases. It is because more QI attributes will cause the equivalence classes to have less number of tuples for the same generalization levels. Hence the generalization levels have to be increased in order to satisfy the same requirement.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the problem of data publishing on multiple non-centralized datasets, which store information about the same group of individuals and share a common sensitive attribute with the same domain. We have shown that such a problem is different from data publishing on a centralized dataset and serial data publishing on a dynamic/static dataset in the sense that there is no dataset that stores all information for non-centralized data publishing. To solve the problem, we first propose a statistical approach, which does not rely on any communications between the data holders, to estimate the information that can be deduced by an adversary who can obtain access to all non-centralized published tables. Then, we propose how to adopt distinct l-diversity [2] to non-centralized data publishing. After that, we propose an algorithm to generate published tables that satisfy non-centralized distinct l-diversity. Our algorithm is modified from Incognito [13] , which is an efficient and widely-used algorithm for (centralized) data publishing. Finally, theorems and experiments are presented to show that the proposed algorithm is correct and feasible to real applications.
